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What is the Role of Cyber Operations in Information Warfare?
Abstract
Much attention has been focused on the potential consequences of cyber attacks against
critical infrastructure and the use of cyber weapons as an asymmetric equalizer. However,
as a capability considered to be under the larger umbrella of an information operations
(IO)/information warfare (IW) campaign, how significant a weapon is cyber for the
strategist in an information environment? As observed in recent IO/IW campaigns targeting
U.S. elections in 2016 and 2020, lack of any discernable disruptive cyber attacks may have
provided an answer to this, as a cyber power purposefully elected not to implement
attacks. Instead, cyber espionage was used, and even at that, played a minor
complementary role in the larger effort. This calls into question the efficacy of cyber as an
instrument of IO/IW, and the true nature of its role in more strategic soft-power operations.
This paper argues that cyber is at best a supportive enabler of campaigns where
information is the catalyst to achieve strategic results, reducing cyber attacks as tools best
used for signaling, punishment, or implemented in first strike scenarios.
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Introduction
During the past few years, the United States has focused on the potential
consequences that cyberattacks can inflict against critical infrastructure
(CI).1 These attacks can have far-reaching effects, and the incidents that
have transpired against the sector have garnered attention and frequent
calls to bolster the country’s overall security posture. Cyber espionage
campaigns have also proven prolific, garnering news attention based on
the target(s), global reach, and the type of information exposed, with the
recent 2020 SolarWinds breach underscoring how vulnerabilities in the IT
supply chain can lead to detrimental results.2
However, cyberattacks are not the only serious threat facing the United
States and based on the results of soft-power activities during the 2016
U.S. presidential elections, one must consider if the government’s focus on
them have not missed seeing the forest for the trees. The 2016 election
revealed how ill-prepared the country was to address the soft-power tenets
of information warfare (IW), especially those information-enabled
campaigns and influence operations that integrated disinformation,
misinformation, and propaganda against a civilian population. Here,
information and not the ones and zeroes that makeup the digital domain
aided Russia in achieving its strategic objectives. That is not to say that
cyber operations did not have a function; they did, but only in a
supportive, secondary role.
This article reviews the information environment, looks at cyberspace as a
warfighting domain, and compares real-life cyberattacks versus cyber
espionage as they apply to information warfare campaigns in achieving
strategic goals. An examination of real-life cyber activities will reveal that
cyberattacks are tactical weapons at best and show that cyber espionage is
not only more effective but is also the natural complement to the
information activities observed in recent state-driven influence campaigns
and disinformation operations.
“Ideas are far more powerful than guns. We don't let our people have guns. Why
should we let them have ideas?”
-Joseph Stalin
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Information Warfare and the Information Environment
There is no current official U.S. government definition of information
warfare (IW). However, the United States has defined information
operations (IO) in its Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 313, characterizing IO as “the integrated employment, during military
operations, of IRCs [information-related capabilities] in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision
making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our
own.”3 Information operations consists of the following core activities:
Military deception, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
operations security, and computer network operations.4 While IW and IO
seem similar, the key differential lies at the level they are implemented.
According to a 2018 report from the non-partisan Congressional Research
Service, IW occurs at the strategic level, whereas IO uses informationenabled capabilities to implement the strategy.5
The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the strategic
level as “the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a
group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or
coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and
uses national resources to achieve those objectives.”6 Therefore, for the
purposes of this article, information warfare will be defined as the
purposeful use and exploitation of the information environment via
information-enabled operations with the intent of creating an effect on a
target audience. Information-enabled operations, for example influence
campaigns, disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, in this
context are those soft power activities that leverage the information
environment that includes the cyber domain, as well as more traditional
print, radio, and television channels.

What is the Information Environment?
Per DoD Joint Pub 3-13, the information environment:
is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that
collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This
environment consists of three interrelated dimensions which
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continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems.
These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive.7
This definition has value in a public sector sense as well as a military one.
Information-related capabilities (IRC) modify the dimensions of a target
audience to influence their decision-making process to achieve an
intended effect. IRCs are planned, created, and conducted via IO channels
once a strategy is place. The global and accessible nature of the
information environment makes it difficult to a state to completely
control, no matter how authoritarian the regime. Information can create
intended effects on a target, a capability that benefits from the facility of
its production, alteration, and dissemination, as well as how audiences
receive it. Ultimately, reactions to it can run contrary to a state’s interests.

Cyberspace as a Warfighting Domain
Much emphasis has been placed on the emergence of cyberspace as a
separate domain of warfare and protecting military resources that rely on
information networks for a variety of vital operations such as commandand-control, supporting the intelligence cycle, logistics, and weapons
technologies, among others.8 In Joint-Pub 3-12, the DoD defines
cyberspace as:
the global domain within the information environment consisting
of the interdependent network of information technology
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers.9
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the DoD publicly codified cyberspace as a
warfighting domain in 2010, identifying it as a “relevant domain for DoD
activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.” 10
Indeed, the importance of denying adversaries use of the cyber domain
while ensuring its ability to operate freely is a key U.S. military objective.
Two executive actions taken by the previous two presidents underscore
such importance. In June 2013, a former National Security Agency
contractor leaked an alleged copy of Presidential Directive 20 (PDD-20)
that detailed United States policies for engaging in offensive cyber
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operations against adversaries. PDD-20 defines the types of operations
allowed under presidential authority.11 In 2018, then-president Trump
rescinded the PDD in favor of a policy framework that enabled military
commanders to have more leeway to conduct cyber operations against
adversaries.12 The result has been much quicker than PDD-20 and yielded
operational success, at least according to one White House official in
2019.13

Cyber Activity Dominates the News…But at What Cost?
Cyberattacks have garnered attention from the press and a global
community drawn to how savvy attackers can exploit a complex
interconnected world by using as little as a laptop or desktop computer.
Cybercrime continues to proliferate with costs estimated to reach USD
10.5 trillion by 2025.14 Large scale breaches that have exposed individuals’
data such as those suffered by Adobe in 2013 (153 million), Adult Friend
Finder in 2016 (412 million), and Equifax in 2017 (147 million) have made
attackers near-monolithic.15 Destructive attacks perpetuate this image.
The world suffered under a NotPetya ransomware attack that targeted
Ukraine then spread globally.16
The potential weaknesses of industrial control systems were revealed in
such attacks like the 2015 cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid that
shut off the lights for 250,000 users and as recently as the February 2021
compromise of a Florida water treatment facility.17 Collectively, these and
many other incidents have fed, and rightly so, the need for governments to
design and implement national-level comprehensive cybersecurity
strategies that focus on addressing the mitigation of such attacks.
However, according to the Center for Strategic & International Studies,
only 78 countries had a national strategy guiding national, coordinated
deterrents and responses to cyber threats, and several of these were
grossly outdated.18
Much to the detriment of senior U.S. government leadership, the focus on
cyberattacks has overshadowed the more readily implemented soft power
IOIW tenets that only require content, a platform, and an audience to
execute. This is disconcerting considering that these types of activities
have proven instrumental in helping achieve the destabilization of
countries with the hope of attaining the strategic objectives of replacing
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their governments. Clearly, the outcomes of the “Color Revolutions”
revealed how the construction, controlling, and effective dissemination of
information can have substantial influence in shaping the outcome of
geopolitical events.19 Similarly, the 2016 U.S. presidential influence
campaign revealed how tactical IO operations supported the larger
strategic objectives of the Russian IW campaign to instill no confidence in
the public about its government and further stoke the flames of social
division.
Information-enabled activities played a critical role in this effort,
disseminating propaganda, and distributing disinformation or
misinformation leading up to and increasing after the election. These were
not attacks designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy information systems
and networks. On the contrary, the successful implementation of these
activities required the technical architecture and infrastructure of the
cyber domain to remain in perfect working order so that they quickly
reached as far as they could and targeted the right consumers.
When reviewing the 2016 influence campaign, Russia pushed highlycharged political and social themes via social media platforms to reach
audiences directly and without censor. What’s more, when the messages
succeeded in incensing their targets, effected recipients passed on these
messages, thereby perpetuating the disinformation or misinformation
cycle.20 A 2017 Stanford University study revealed that fake news stories
about presidential candidates were shared approximately 37.6 million
times in 2016.21 The tactical results were clear and immediate: By taking
advantage of an already polarized environment, Russia inundated
audiences with contradictory reports without an immediate or reliable
means to help discern truth from half-truth impacted human cognition,
thereby heightening confusion and further raising tensions.
Furthermore, Russia complemented its IW campaign with other soft
power activities such as propaganda to serve as a platform for Moscow’s
messaging and cyber espionage to both steal information and instill
uncertainty in the minds of the public.22 The multi-pronged IO assault led
Russia to achieve its broader strategic IW goals:
1. To sow discontent in the U.S. public.
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2. Undermine public faith in the U.S. election process; and 3)
exploit the free press and uncensored nature how the United
States produced, disseminated, and consumed news and
information.
Perhaps more compelling is that Russia successfully influenced their
target audiences by affecting their behavior in the way that was most
beneficial to Moscow’s interests, in this case, the ongoing U.S. public
discontent and distrust of its government.

Cyberattacks Do not Support IW Campaigns
What is even more notable about the 2016 U.S. election, and often
overlooked, is the lack of destructive or disruptive cyberattacks executed
by Russian agents, or more likely, via cut-outs or proxies working at
Moscow’s behest. There are several examples of where Russia through
these actors has executed such attacks, particularly during times of
geopolitical tension. Why this is important is that it stands in marked
contrast to Russia’s 2008 military intervention in the crisis in South
Ossetia, Georgia. At that time, disruptive attacks targeted the networks of
major media outlets, in addition to those of the government and financial
institutions.23 As the goal was to reclaim South Ossetia, Russia did not
need a soft-power offensive as much as a direct one designed to achieve
tactical objectives like impacting the government’s ability to disseminate
information. In this instance cyberattacks—not cyber espionage—were the
appropriate support element. The incidents against Estonia and Ukraine
also exemplify this type of behavior.24
But clearly Moscow did not take the same approach against its biggest
adversary likely because any substantial or blatantly overt cyberattack
would have immediately risked response, engagement, potential
escalation, and the possible introduction of kinetic weaponry. Even more
so, cyberattacks would not have been cohesive with the larger IW strategy
that Russia put into place, because by their nature, cyberattacks are
tactical in their execution. Like any weapon they have a specific purpose
with a narrow window of opportunity to leverage surprise for operational
success. As such, cyberattacks are at their best when they achieve limited
and immediate results such as state signaling, meting out punishment, or
proactive mitigation strikes to disrupt impending or future activity. They
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are not as successful supporting more refined operations that require a
defter touch.
•

•

•

Signaling. The 2007 DDoS attacks launched against Estonia for the
removal of a Soviet statue exemplifies the use of a cyberattack as a
signaling agent. Conducted by Russian nationalists and
sympathizers, the attacks impeded people’s abilities to access the
websites of banks and newspapers and disrupted the Government’s
ability to communicate with its citizens.25 At the peak of the crisis,
Estonians could not access or use their bank cards and mobilephone networks.26 Though Estonia did not wilt under the digital
onslaught, the attackers made their point. In 2009, North Korea
allegedly conducted DDoS attacks against public and private sector
South Korean and U.S. organizations.27 The attacks occurred onemonth after United Nations-imposed economic sanctions and
coincided with North Kora’s short-range ballistic missile launch,
suggesting that North Korea used the attacks to signal its discontent
over the new measures.
Punishment and Retaliation. In 2019, the United States allegedly
conducted an unspecified cyberattack against Russia’s power grid,
as well as against Russia’s Internet Research Agency in response to
Russian penetration of U.S. nuclear facility and activities during the
2016 presidential elections, respectively.28 The Operation Ababil
DDoS attacks against the U.S. financial sector can also be viewed
through the prism of retaliation. In that case, a previously unknown
hacktivist group assumed credit for the attacks, claiming they were
perpetrated in response to the anti-Islam film “Innocence of
Muslims,” which sparked worldwide controversy.29 In 2016, the
U.S. Department of Justice later indicted seven Iranians that
worked for a company that performed work for the Iranian
government.30 In the face of U.S. sanctions imposed at the time
against Iran for its nuclear program, and coming on the heels of the
suspected United States-led Stuxnet attack against an enrichment
facility, one can infer that Operation Ababil was a proportional
retaliation for these perceived transgressions.
Proactive Strike. In a shift from defensive to offensive cyber
operations, in 2019 the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
embraced persistent engagement, a proactive strategy to take the
fight to the adversary prior to them being able to conduct
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cyberattacks against the United States. Per press reports,
CYBERCOM executed operations against Iranian and Russian
networks months leading up to the 2020 presidential election,
temporarily paralyzing some and neutralizing ransomware tools.31
In its ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia allegedly launched a
cyberattack to impact Ukraine’s power grid in 2015, causing a
temporary loss of power. A 2016 instance impacted another
Ukrainian substation. These cyberattacks sought to destabilize
Ukraine as it sought to distance itself from Russia, as they came in
the wake of a political revolution with Russian annexation of
Crimea.32
The above incidents combined with other destructive cyberattacks, for
example, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack and the 2012 attack
against Saudi Aramco, clearly reveal the serious and severe damage that
cyberattacks can inflict.33 However, it is also clear that these attacks did
not achieve long-lasting effects. Granted, while that may not have been the
intent, the fact remains that the attacks occurred, effects realized, and
victims eventually mitigated and recovered from them.

Cyber Espionage Incidents Facilitate IW Campaigns
A review of some of the more notable cyber espionage activities reveals
that the softer cousin of a cyberattack has infinitely more value in
supporting strategic IW campaigns. This is largely since cyber espionage is
more focused on manipulation and exploitation than disruption or
destruction. Cyber espionage requires fastidious patience on the part of
operators who execute surreptitious activities, clandestinely gain
unauthorized access into targets, and maintain a presence on targeted
systems and networks. Once inside, operators can perform a variety of
activities that support a nation state’s long-term strategic goals, typically
in the form surveillance, monitoring a target’s activities, and the theft of
sensitive data, intellectual property, or proprietary information.
However, as evidenced in the Russian 2016 IW campaign, cyber espionage
is not limited to intelligence collection but can also serve a supporting role
in a larger multi-faceted operation. According to the 2017 U.S. Intelligence
Community Assessment Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in
Recent US Elections, cyber operations ranged from stealing and leaking
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information to further fueling social discontent and instilling uncertainty
over the integrity of the election.34 Since IW’s intent is to generate a
specific effect on a target audience, these information-enabled activities
take advantage of the information environment for the purposes of
creating a psychological effect. Putting this into context makes one wonder
what other cyber espionage activities have occurred and contributed to
similar strategic IW campaigns.
The following more prolific cyber espionage examples are indicative of
campaigns with possible broader implications than the events themselves.
What’s more, they complement a state’s future IW campaign planning by
exploiting the information environment in a way that values data over the
networks on which they rest or traverse. These activities include
purposeful leaking, compromising the integrity of the data, crafting
propaganda or disinformation narratives, and instilling distrust by
publicly exposing sensitive material.
•

SolarWinds. The December 2020 disclosure of the SolarWinds
breach exposed another exploitation of a company that ultimately
provided access into several high-profile U.S. government
organizations (to include but not limited to Departments of
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, State, and Treasury, among
others) as well as most of the Fortune 500 companies.35 Per
reporting, an estimated 18,000 organizations were impacted
although not all of these experienced a follow-on intrusion.36 This
extensive breach represents one of the most complex and
sophisticated cyber intrusions to date based on the victims and the
types of activities the attackers engaged in once they gained access.
For example, the attackers compromised the email accounts of top
Treasury officials, and in the case of one computer security
company, the attackers stole proprietary penetration tools used to
test customer networks.37
While officials continue to investigate the compromise, its purpose
is consistent with a nation state’s cyber exploitation of network
accesses, and in some cases, information theft as well. However, the
U.S. government immediately acknowledged the severity of this
intrusion, and an emergency meeting with the National Security
Council invoked a directive to create a special group to manage the
80
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•

•

government’s response to the breach.38 As of February 2021, the
U.S. government has not responded to the attackers, believed to be
either Russian state actors or those working on its behest. The new
U.S. president immediately called the breach a top priority, and
highlighted deficiencies in U.S. cybersecurity.39 As one online
computer periodical stated, the SolarWinds “hack is a wakeup call
for taking cybersecurity action.”40
Equifax. In March 2017, Equifax, one of the major credit reporting
agencies that assesses the financial stability of most people in the
United States, suffered a breach exposing the sensitive personal and
financial data of 147 million people.41Among the types of data stolen
included names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers,
drivers’ licenses numbers, and credit cards, among others.42 As
opposed to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach in
2015, the Equifax had all the hallmarks of being perpetrated by
cyber criminals, given the financial focus of the credit reporting
agency. However, the U.S. government ultimately attributed the
activity to the Chinese government in a 2017 indictment by the
Department of Justice.43 Due to the importance of such an agency
to the fiscal health of citizens who need it to establish a record of
financial responsibility for everything ranging from seeking
employment to purchasing homes, loss of such data can impose
serious national security consequences as well. The 2017 U.S.
National Security Strategy acknowledged that hostile cyber activity
such as that observed in the Equifax compromise could potentially
have cascading effects across multiple sectors of the economy.44
Unsurprisingly, this incident shows the far-reaching consequences
of a breach of this magnitude.
OPM Breach. In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) disclosed that it had twice suffered a breach
impacting its employees in 2014, putting their SF-86 forms, and
therefore their sensitive personal data at risk, as well as security
clearance information.45 The breach potentially put at risk
information resident in other databases such as Department of
Defense service records and Department of State passport
records.46 Approximately 22.1 million individuals were impacted by
the breach, which many believe was perpetrated by the Chinese
government, and for which a Chinese national was indicted in 2017
for being linked to malware used in the OPM compromise.47 The
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breach is an intelligence collection boon, as the types of data stolen
would certainly support other espionage activities to include but not
limited to continued human and cyber intelligence targeting.
However, one 2018 report revealed that unknown actors used the
stolen data to commit fraud suggesting that cyber criminals and not
a nation state committed the breach.48 Regardless how the
individuals obtained the data to commit the fraud, based on the
type of target (a U.S. government organization holding sensitive
personal security clearance data), there is understandable
skepticism that this was the effort of criminals. Unsurprisingly, the
U.S. government’s failure to secure some of the most sensitive
information of its employees raised the question of what the
government was doing to bolster cybersecurity. This has become a
cause-effect reflex that is par for the course when large breaches
garner the attention of the international community.

Conclusion
The threat of a catastrophic cyberattack and the potentially severe damage
it can cause is a real concern. However, an information attack is the bigger
threat and one that has already taken place. Future attackers are likely
studying what happened so as to refine their operations and streamline
their processes for future targeting. Looking from a lessons-learned
perspective on the IW activities that occurred in the months leading up to
and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, the soft power elements of
IW proved instrumental in exploiting the social and political tensions
festering in the country. What’s more is that the Russian IW campaign
took advantage of what has long been the United States’ core strength—
freedom to produce and disseminate uncensored content. The 2016 IW
campaign revealed that the soft nature of cyber espionage naturally lends
itself to supporting information-enabled activities involved in conducting
larger IW strategic efforts precisely because they seek to exploit
information rather than destroy or disrupt systems that process and
distribute it. A cyberattack accompanying the 2016 campaign would have
undoubtedly worked contrary to the pollical objectives Russia sought,
uniting the U.S populace rather than dividing it.
Cybersecurity challenges continually test the private and public sectors,
and the U.S. government through the Department of Homeland Security
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and the National Institute of Technology and Standards provides the
private sector with guidance and recommendations to counter cyber
threats. Industry-led Information Sharing and Analytic Centers
complement these efforts by increasing and facilitating the informationsharing process. However, while the U.S. government has developed and
enacted national strategies addressing cybersecurity,49 there is no
equivalent for the soft power elements—namely propaganda and
disinformation—of IW performing the same public service. Solely focusing
on the ones-and-zeroes glaringly fails to address the information aspects
of the larger information security ecosystem.
More than mid-way through 2021, the U.S. government continues to show
its reliance on tech companies and news media outlets fostering increased
collaboration in an effort to counter such threats on social media
platforms. However, given a recent survey revealing that most Americans
believe that politics is what drives these organizations to censor their
platforms, this is a mistake.50 Advising these companies on what to censor
and block is akin to the activities of our adversaries that view such
information control as necessary to regime survival. Worse, these activities
do not unify an already divided United States but exacerbate already
existing tensions. The U.S. government should heed this clarion bell as it
heads down the dangerous path of becoming exactly like the authoritarian
regimes that it denounces, which may ultimately be Russia’s greatest IW
objective of all.
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